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A number of authors have argued that a ‘new intergovernmentalism’ has come to characterise EU
decision-making since the ﬁnancial crisis, with decisions increasingly made through
intergovernmental negotiations such as those in the European Council. Christopher Bickerton
writes on what the theory can tell us about the Greek crisis, noting that it helps illustrate both the
febrile nature of domestic politics in Greece and why the Syriza government was ultimately
unsuccessful in its attempts to secure concessions from the country’s creditors.
Just as some thought it was over, the Greek crisis has entered into a new and dramatic stage. The
Prime Minister, Alexis Tsipras, has declared snap elections to be held on 20 September. This comes just as the
European Stability Mechanism had transferred 13 billion euros to Athens, out of which 3.2 billion was immediately
sent to the European Central Bank to repay a bond of that amount due on 20 August.
Tsipras has calculated that with public backing for the third bail-out, he can use the election to rid himself of the left
block faction (Popular Unity) within Syriza, which has been vigorously opposing the bail-out deal. He can then
recast himself as a more centrist ﬁgure, while the left-wing faction re-launches itself as an anti-austerity, anti-bailout
party.
The new intergovernmentalism and the Greek crisis
What might the new intergovernmentalism have to tell us about the Greek crisis? It is always tricky to use theories
to explain a moving target, especially one as protean as the Greek crisis, but there are at least three insights into the
crisis that the new intergovernmentalism can provide us with.
The ﬁrst is an explanation for Syriza’s failed attempt
at renegotiation with the Troika. There is still some
hope of debt relief for Greece, but almost all of what
Tsipras had promised to achieve when he was
elected in January this year has been left by the
wayside. The key reason for this failure is that both
Tsipras and Yanis Varoufakis, the former ﬁnance
minister, wildly over-estimated the appetite in Europe
for more supranational integration.
They came to the negotiations with the view that – in
the name of a more solidaristic European Union –
they might convince creditors to ease the burden on
Greece. They argued that the crisis in Greece was
not only the result of Greek proﬂigacy; other member
states, and especially those with banks that had lent
to Greece in the boom years, needed to shoulder
some of the blame. Sharing the blame, sharing the
burden, and recasting Europe as a more socially-
minded and integrated political community: this was
the hopeful message of Syriza.
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It fell on deaf ears, to say the least. Mildly supportive remarks early on from the likes of François Hollande and
Matteo Renzi were soon drowned out by more hostile demands that Greece toe the line and pay back all its
borrowed euros. Underlying resistance to the Greek message was a refusal to accept its supranational implications.
The new intergovernmentalism argues that post-Maastricht European integration is based on an “integration
paradox”: a signiﬁcant expansion in the scope and depth of EU integration but without deﬁnitive and lasting transfers
of powers from national governments to supranational EU institutions.
This paradox ﬁts with the Greek bail-out deal. EU integration has moved forward as instruments – such as the ESM
– are strengthened and new ones are created. But there is no heady ﬂight towards ﬁscal union or any real burden-
sharing. The language of European responsibility and solidarity deployed by Syriza is empty rhetoric, unmatched by
any political wish or will on the part of the EU’s member states.
Another insight the new intergovernmentalism provides is about why – in the course of the last six to eight months –
Yanis Varoufakis became a persona non grata. Appointed ﬁnance minister after the January elections, Varoufakis
toured European capitals in an attempt to drum up support for his plan for reforming the Eurozone. He attended all
the Eurogroup meetings, making the same case behind closed doors that he was making to newspapers, blogs and
anyone who would listen. He was described by his admirers as charismatic and handsome and was probably the
only Eurozone ﬁnance minister to have his own (shortlived) Tumblr account created by his fans, entitled ‘Varoufakis
Doing Things’.
For all his eﬀorts, Varoufakis became in the space of just a few months public enemy number one for the
Eurogroup. He was ﬁrst side-lined by Tsipras as a condition for the continuation of talks between Greece and its
creditors. He then resigned of his own accord, though it was clear he would have been kicked out had he not gone
ﬁrst. Why did Eurogroup ﬁnance ministers end up hating Varoufakis so much? Some of the explanation probably lies
in the patronising tones he used to address his political peers. He saw the whole enterprise as an intellectual activity
where the most logically consistent argument wins and there was no doubt he thought his argument was superior to
all others. Being lectured by Varoufakis about economics and being asked to hand-over billions of euros in loans at
the same time was too much for people like Schäuble.
A more likely explanation is that Varoufakis openly ﬂouted the guiding norms of the Eurogroup. As argued by the
new intergovernmentalist framework, deliberation and consensus have become the key norms of day-to-day
decision-making at all levels of EU policymaking including the Eurogroup. As norms, deliberation and consensus are
not necessarily democratic; that depends on the wider institutional setting. The Eurogroup is a closed and private
body, with no real legal status in the EU’s treaties. Its deliberative and consensual nature is far-removed from
Varoufakis’ notion of presenting demands on behalf of the Greek people. Acting as an open and unabashed
representative of his own people, Varoufakis exposed the Eurogroup’s democratic failings and the other members
could not forgive him for it. He had to go.
A ﬁnal insight provided by the new intergovernmentalism is to do with the febrile nature of Greek politics. It is striking
that Tsipras, though elected according to all the procedures of party government in Greece, has understood his
power in a plebiscitarian way and has sought to renew his mandate at every critical juncture in the negotiations with
the Troika. Greek party government is in crisis. The governing parties of Pasok and New Democracy have been
either swept away or fatally weakened by their association with the boom and bust of the last decade.
What remains are the margins – Syriza, Independent Greeks – that have sought to govern but have done so very
conscious of their own weakness. This is why Tsipras has needed to renew his mandate through referenda. The
new intergovernmentalism tells us that these problems in domestic preference formation – i.e. crises in the political
system itself, in the very means by which interests are aggregated together – have become a standalone input into
European integration. The EU cannot shield itself from the challenges faced by party government across Europe
today. In fact, these challenges have become a constitutive part of the EU integration process itself.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
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Note: This article originally appeared at the OUP blog. It gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP –
European Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
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